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For Virginia Woolf (1882-1941), the Victorian Angel in the House was dangerous. 
The Angel’s injunction to women to ‘be sympathetic’ threatened the very existence of 
the woman writer – or, at least, those women writers who wanted to use their own 
minds and have their own say.
1
 In Woolf’s great interwar novel, To the Lighthouse 
(1927), such ‘womanly sympathy’ is at once Mrs Ramsay’s domestic gift and her 
burden and the novel explores its extraordinary power as well as its costs for women. 
But while Woolf was right to diagnose sympathy as one of the constitutive elements 
of an idealized maternal femininity and a painfully restrictive domestic ideology, her 
target is narrow and consequently misses the plural and flexible roles of sympathy 
through the Victorian period. In particular, it mutes the importance of the attempt 
fully to secularize sympathy by making it part of the evolutionary account of species 
development. While the explicit evolutionary explanation of why and how we feel for 
others was largely in the hands of male scientists and philosophers, it was literature – 
and novels especially – that modeled and realized sympathy, and women writers who 
were central to this epistemological task. Indeed, sympathy was key to how women 
writers in the nineteenth century sought to configure both women’s place in a 
changing world and, simultaneously, the expanding possibilities of fiction writing. 
Neither the Angel resplendent nor her slaying at the hands of her writing daughter 
fully captures how the concept and practice of sympathy developed and exerted 
effects across the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Beginning with why sympathy was such an important term for the Victorians, 
I first consider how it was mobilized as a response to the material and social 
challenges of industrialism. In the hands of Elizabeth Gaskell (1810-65), sympathy is 
a key medium for binding within, and reaching across, class and gender boundaries. 
Gaskell’s complex rendering of sympathy is ultimately supported by the Christian 
principle of God’s self-giving love. In sympathy’s secular re-working, by contrast, 
new possibilities and unintended consequences emerge. George Eliot (1819-80) is the 
key figure here as she sought with great success to make sympathy the bedrock of the 
realist novel’s moral and formal work in secularizing social contexts. By the 1870s, 
Eliot was hard against the implications of sympathy’s relocation within naturalistic 
accounts. Charles Darwin (1809-82) had tried to ground the evolutionary rationale for 
sympathy by making it a quality shared by all social animals. Others, including the 
man who vied with Darwin for being first to describe evolution through natural 
selection, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), saw sympathy as fundamental to 
retaining human distinctiveness and thus the special social, intellectual, and moral 
qualities of ‘civilized’ human societies. These accounts contained versions of 
sympathy that readily fitted existing moral economies – but they also gave rise to 
striking alternatives. These included the imperative to sanction seemingly harsh action 
(such as withholding aid to the needy or using animals for experimentation) on the 
understanding that sympathy must facilitate long-term goals of social progress.
2
  
Sympathy was evoked and claimed by all side. Contested in this way and doing 
service in new moral economies, it was a burdened concept.  
This moment of conceptual strain for sympathy helps shape Eliot’s final 
novel, Daniel Deronda (1876). Notoriously peculiar within Eliot’s oeuvre, its genre-
pushing experimentation and surprising gothic quality have much to do with these 
contemporary debates about sympathy’s moral efficacy in the context of modern 
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European society. Eliot had long worked to solder together ethic and aesthetic in a 
realism that made deeply particularized human experience the material of moral 
consciousness and development. The decades following her death in 1880 saw a 
variety of attacks on this relation – including, for example, the avowedly 
unsympathetic narrator of the naturalist novel, neutrally observing and reporting what 
she sees. The critique of sympathy at the end of the century is contemporaneous with 
the ending of a distinctively ‘Victorian’ realism of which Eliot is often held as the 
greatest exponent. This essay argues, however, that in Daniel Deronda Eliot was 
already pushing to its limits sympathy and (and in) its relation to realist form.  
Inherited sympathy 
The Victorians inherited sympathy from the eighteenth century and it arrived heavily 
freighted, lodged amidst other important and morally charged terms such as sentiment 
and sensibility. For eighteenth-century philosophers and novelists like Lord 
Shaftesbury and Laurence Sterne, the capacity to feel vividly and spontaneously for 
another’s plight was fundamental to being human. The varied accounts of sympathy 
that proliferated in the eighteenth century were urgent ripostes, designed to counter 
the growing power of philosophies of self-interest.
3
 Challenging Christian and moral 
orthodoxy, self-interest was presented in these philosophies as not accidentally 
compatible with public good but absolutely necessary for it. Such alarming ideas 
gained traction amidst swiftly changing social and economic conditions, characterized 
by financial, agricultural, and industrial change, scientific and technical innovation, 
and accompanying social transformation. The political scientist, Ryan Patrick Hanley, 
sees sympathy as ‘a sophisticated philosophical response to a pressing practical 
challenge’ involving profound changes in social organization whereby ‘societies of 
strangers emerged alongside more traditional and familiar communities of intimates’.
4
 
Against a post-Hobbesian view of the social contract as founded in and by fear of 
strife and conflict, sympathy promised to ground sociality in genuine and spontaneous 
fellow feeling, not necessarily requiring Christian injunction or sanction, and thus 
fitted for secular moral business. 
This version of natural feeling was modified and popularized by one of the 
most influential philosophical interventions in eighteenth-century debate about 
feeling, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). In Smith’s account, the 
mechanism of sympathetic fellow-feeling is imagination: we sympathize because of 
our ability to ‘chang[e] places in fancy’ with others.
5
 Bodily senses can only ever give 
access to the self, but imagination pushes extension out beyond that self towards 
others. It makes pity both human and social. Sympathy for Smith is a process of 
mutual emotional adjustment between people. This constant adjustment and 
sympathetic reciprocity is necessarily also a process of self-modification, tempering 
self in relation to the others who make up a wider sociality. Smith’s account resolves 
the moral opposition and allows for the conflation of self and social interests 
inasmuch as the pleasures and pains of the self are a necessary part of sympathy’s 
happiness-fostering propensity. 
Smithian imagination also consolidated sympathy’s relation to artistic and 
literary sensibility: to feel sympathy for others in appropriate ways was a marker of 
taste. Those with the most exquisite taste and refinement, according to the new ‘cult’ 
of sensibility, felt most intensely – including feeling that might prompt benevolent 
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action in the world. Understood as a matter of taste and judgment, sympathy was 
readily ascribed class and gender value. According to the literary critic Jonathan 
Lamb, Smith overtly distinguished between propriety and humanity in the task of 
sympathizing, occasionally aligning the former with men and the latter with women. 
The ‘becoming use of what is our own’ – our own sensibly felt sensations – implies 
an agency and self-direction commensurate with propriety. Propriety is the 
foundational type of judgment in Smith’s system and, in contrast, ‘humanity’ requires 
‘no great exertion of the sense of propriety’ because it consists in doing ‘what this 
exquisite sympathy would of its own accord prompt us to do’.
6
 In women, sympathy 
can simply occur, welling up from natural sources, unconstrained by the discretion 
and discrimination required by propriety, and thus nullifying women’s active moral 
agency. 
Womanly sympathy and the condition of England 
This imprimatur of naturalness made an adjectively modified ‘womanly’ sympathy 
central to the development of middle-class domestic ideology in the nineteenth 
century and the ‘separate spheres’ appropriate to men and women. John Ruskin’s 
celebrated Manchester lecture to ‘queenly’ women judged men ‘feeble in sympathy’ 
and open to a ‘misrule and violence’ that could be stayed only by women’s greater 
ability to ‘feel the depths of pain, and conceive the way of its healing’. Nevertheless, 
it is striking in ‘Of Queen’s Gardens’ (1865) – especially its closing call to middle-
class women’s wider social conscience – how insubstantial and inefficacious this 
‘natural’ womanly sympathy actually seems to be. Socially privileged women are far 
too ready, Ruskin chides, to ignore social ills and the suffering of others, too content 
with their own narrow comforts, averting eye, mind, and imagination from the ‘wild 
grass’ and agony beyond their rose-bedecked garden walls.
7
 
For Ruskin, as for many Victorians, it was still Jesus Christ’s compassion that 
modeled a world of sustaining sympathy.
8
 Christian precept was seen as imperiled, 
however, threatening to ebb away in a modern world riven with class conflict and 
bullish about the unassailable value of self-interest. From the Christian fortitude of 
Guy Morville in Charlotte Yonge’s The Heir of Redclyffe (1853) to the posturing of 
Josiah Bounderby in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times (1854), novelists of all kinds, 
both men and women, dramatized the moral implications of self-interest and its 
alternatives. But valuing feeling was not straightforward for the Victorians, with or 
without religious belief. Even Evangelicalism, the ‘heart religion’ that so valued 
feeling, was deeply concerned that untrustworthy and unchecked internal impulses 
might promote self-indulgence.
9
 Thomas Carlyle, for example, was a fierce critic of 
feeling in this respect.
10
 Dickens, by contrast, though thoroughly at one with Carlyle’s 
fulminations against the ‘machine’ sensibility of utilitarian thought, sought in his 
fictions and journalism to power up feeling, to translate sympathetic tears into social 
actions. In his novels, a dazzling mix of satire, melodrama, and realism was intended 
to make sympathy operative in tackling the grave ‘condition of England’, especially 
in the nation’s industrial heartlands and its inhumanly bureaucratic cities. 
Sympathizing conjoins here with the bodily manifestations of sentiment. Readers who 
laughed and cried at home should and must also be agents for change in the outside 
world. Marguerite Gardiner, Countess of Blessington, prophesied enthusiastically to 
John Forster on reading The Chimes (1844) that: ‘this book will melt hearts and open 




But it was women who were more demanded-of and simultaneously more 
suspect because of their sympathy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was women novelists – 
some with similar aims to Dickens’ – who probed most deeply into it. Commenting 
recently on Mary Barton (1848), John Sutherland states that ‘one thing [Elizabeth 
Gaskell] had in huge supply was womanly sympathy’. None of the other (mainly 
male) social problem novelists of the period, according to Sutherland, had the same 
‘overwhelming well of human sympathy which floods through Gaskell’s work’.
12
 
Gaskell’s Unitarian-inflected Christianity helped shape her intention, in Mary Barton, 
to show a working-class culture bonded by powerful human sympathies that are 
damaged and frayed by poverty, economic hardship, and brutalized living conditions. 
Gaskell aimed to humanize ‘labour’, transforming the calculus of its worth. 
Importantly, though, class unifies more powerfully than gender, even though a 
woman models sympathy most obviously. Mary’s sympathetic capacities are matched 
in the men with whom she shares her world, especially those of her increasingly 
damaged and damaging father, John Barton. Responding to the crisis into which 
typhoid fever tips an already impoverished family, Barton and his friend Wilson 
embed their practical help in the dank and unhealthy environment of the Davenports’ 
basement hovel in ‘heart-service, and love-works of far more value’ than material 
provision.
13
 Mary Barton thus dramatizes the distortion and damage done to internal 
impulse by external conditions. 
A few years later, in North and South (1855), the depiction of class-based 
bonds fractured and strained by the conditions of urban industrialism is replaced by a 
different kind of investigation of sympathy, focused on the novel’s middle-class 
protagonist, Margaret Hale. At one level, the lesson Margaret has to learn about the 
industrial north parallels the hard work of sympathizing across class boundaries that 
the novel advocates as a means to improve inter-class relations. In this latter domain, 
the necessary expansion of experience that supports and is supported by imagination 
and fosters both feeling and ameliorative action takes shape in the experiment in 
mutuality that ensures John Thornton’s factory workers a decent dinner (445-6). But 
in Margaret Hale Gaskell also provides a complex portrait of a specifically ‘womanly 
sympathy’. The phrase is directly used in North and South (though not in Gaskell’s 
other major fictions) during the early days of Margaret’s life in the alien northern 
industrial city when she is still unsettled, even frightened, by the bold, noisy, and 
unrestrained crowds who go in and out of the factory gates. It is the girls she warms to 
first, especially their ‘simple reliance on her womanly sympathy with their love of 
dress’.
14
 Sympathy here means affinity and, while the narrator assures us that 
Margaret is glad to respond to their sartorial queries and to ‘half-smile’ back to them, 
readers are clear that she does not feel genuine reciprocity with these young, fashion-
conscious working-class women. The bar to identification, however, is not class but 
gender.  
North and South famously begins with a scene in which Margaret stages ironic 
resistance to sartorial feminine stereotype, as she stands displaying the beautiful 
Indian shawls that form a part of her cousin Edith’s wedding trousseau. Everything 
about this scene works to distinguish Margaret from a gendered communality 
constituted by women’s ‘love of dress’. She enjoys the shawls for their sensory 
qualities and when she pictures herself wearing them her pleasure is likened to a 
child’s, delighted by dressing up. The entrance of a man, Mr Lennox, making the 
other women uneasily ‘half-ashamed’ of their feminine absorptions, prompts 
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Margaret to identify with him, not with them: she is only amused, ‘sure of his 
sympathy in her sense of the ludicrousness of being thus surprised’ (40). Whatever 
else sympathy may be, for Margaret Hale it is not a given and unproblematically 
natural quality of her womanhood. Instead, it is a process closely paralleling the 
efforts with which Margaret gains knowledge. 
For, soon enough, Margaret will have little amusement in her life and the 
sympathy she must manifest in her new circumstances requires exertion, effort, and 
self-control. In this it is inextricable from the dictation of her religious faith and 
perhaps little comprehensible apart from it. Her father’s relinquishment of his Church 
of England living – an impulse of conscience that comes to him as if from outside to 
drive his action – mutes his paternal responsibility along with his will. Margaret has 
to step into this breach, learning to practice patience and fortitude within the close 
spaces of her family as she strives to shed prejudice and ignorance about the wider 
new world she inhabits. She must develop Smithian propriety, we might conclude. 
Margaret is a good daughter and churchwoman but, in the wearying period following 
her mother’s death when she struggles with the inner tumult of her confused feelings 
for John Thornton, her ‘womanly sympathy’ is far from the spontaneous 
‘overwhelming well’ of feeling that John Sutherland detects in Gaskell herself. While 
Margaret and her father share grief – they draw ‘very close to each other in unspoken 
sympathy’ (363), for instance, on the first occasion they go out together following 
Mrs Hale’s death – Margaret is never in a position of unambiguous identification with 
the sufferings of either parent. In the midst of adversity she has to push herself out of 
‘listless langour’ to ‘reward her father’ for his care of her: it is ‘unconscious piety’ 
that makes her his ‘ready sympathiser’, a broken-down ‘meek spirit of obedience’ 
discovered in the face of suffering (383; 424).  
Womanly sympathy, in Gaskell’s depiction of Margaret Hale, is not a 
spontaneous and natural response – of affinity, identification, or reciprocated feeling – 
but a resource that requires great effort of conscious will and self-control, supported 
fundamentally by her religious faith Her depiction in this respect implicitly challenges 
how women appear in the long and contested history of philosophical debate about 
the value of feeling. In the seventeenth century, Descartes and Spinoza were amongst 
the philosophers who promoted reason and cognition as the ingredients for self-
integrity; they were suspicious of feelings as forces that ‘dictate’ or direct responses, 
rendering a person un-free, unable to act according to their own will, and therefore 
liable to be acted upon.
15
 One legacy of this division of reason from feeling is that 
those deemed weakest in reason – women, the working classes, the so-called ‘lower’ 
races – were habitually configured as more prone to feeling, more in danger of being 
buffeted by its effects. Writing in the same year as the publication of Mary Barton, a 
contributor to Chambers Edinburgh Journal acknowledges that while sympathy is 
‘one of the noblest attributes of man, and seems, as it were, the mark of his Divine 
origin’, it is nevertheless dangerous when unchecked: sympathetic feeling 
uncontrolled can lead to overwhelming states of pity, contagions of mimicry, and all 
manner of ‘strange and fatal eccentricities’.
16
 
This division of feeling from reason was woven into the fabric of debate about 
political and other forms of modernization. It fuelled anxiety about, and resistance to, 
the extension of voting right, for instance; and it was an especial feature of attacks 
against the prospect of women’s enfranchisement. Three years after the passing of the 
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Second Reform Act, in 1970, Tinsley’s Magazine tartly reminded its readers that the 
weakness of sentimental people ‘consists in delivering over their own self-sovereignty 
to a set of lawless and turbulent emotions’. There is ‘good reason why women should 
be excluded from the franchise’, the writer concludes, given the sex’s ‘essentially 
sentimental nature’, governed by unrestrained sympathies rather than the calming 
force of reason.
17
 This was the reason, too, why novels were seen as suspect, 
particularly for women. In novels, sympathies are manipulated and allowed too free 
and pleasurable a range. Promiscuous in their reach and consumption, novels bypass 
or neutralize the forces of restraint and reason upon which, for commentators like 





It was, nevertheless, a woman novelist who, by this same period, had done much to 
reposition and reenergize sympathy as central simultaneously to secular ethics and to 
the moral function of the realist novel. In doing so, she also succeeded in promoting 
the novel as an aesthetic form. George Levine has described this novelist, George 
Eliot, as ‘almost obsessed with sympathy’s possibilities’.
19
 Eliot saw sympathy as the 
key to how the mystery of the moral law within might be reframed for a generation of 
agnostic, scientifically-oriented intellectuals. The career trajectory of the young 
Marian Evans, from youthful evangelicalism, through the ‘Holy War’ of her lost 
Christian faith and, via the freethinking Brays and Hennells, to the work of Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, serves for a model of a distinctively 
Victorian intellectual upheaval where sympathy is the human face turned foremost 
against the rejected dogmas of Christianity. In a series of essays for the Westminster 
Review in the 1850s, Eliot attacked Christian teaching that substitutes ‘a reference to 
the glory of God for the direct promptings of the sympathetic feelings’.
20
 In these 
essays – though not always explicitly – she was also developing a theory of realism. 
For example, she lambasts the poet Edward Young for lacking ‘genuine emotion’ and 
for substituting ‘pedagogic moralizing’ for ‘moral, i.e. […] sympathetic emotion’ – 
the very qualities ‘found in the details of ordinary life’.
21
 Those details are realist 
fiction’s medium, as Eliot developed it. 
Just months after publishing this critique of Young in the Westminster Review, 
Eliot began Adam Bede (1859), cementing her reputation on its appearance as a major 
novelist and promoting her realist creed, ‘creep[ing] servilely after nature and fact’ to 
give ‘a faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored themselves in my 
mind’. The famous defence of realism at the beginning of Chapter 17 of Adam Bede 
has sympathy at its core: Dutch painting delights the narrator because it provides ‘a 
source of delicious sympathy in these faithful pictures of a monotonous homely 
existence’.
22
 Eliot saw the novel as most appropriate to the facilitation of sympathy – 
stirring its working in readers’ minds, hearts, and guts – because it deals in 
particularities rather than generalities. ‘All people of broad, strong sense have an 
instinctive repugnance to the men of maxims’, she wrote in The Mill on the Floss 
(1860), and elsewhere in the same novel she famously condemned the move from 
‘picture to diagram’ that turns to ‘offense’ the ‘aesthetic teaching’ that strives to grasp 
life’s complexities.
23
 The novel’s ethical task is ‘the extension of our sympathies’, 
and art’s value inheres in ‘amplifying experience and extending our contact with our 




But what, exactly, is sympathy for Eliot and in her novels? By the 1860s and 
especially the 1870s, Eliot was part of an intellectual environment in which sympathy 
was being discussed and understood in new ways. As evolutionary ideas deriving 
from Charles Darwin’s biology and Herbert Spencer’s philosophy disseminated 
widely, diverse debate took place about its ethical implications. The origin and 
function of sympathy figured prominently. In 1864, five years after the publication of 
Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), Alfred Russel Wallace questioned whether natural 
selection really applied to humans. Man ‘is social and sympathetic’, he argued, and 
because humans can control and change their environment and are connected by 
sympathetic bonds, they effectively disable the processes of struggle and adaptation 
that drive selection in nature.
25
 In the Descent of Man (1871), Darwin acknowledged 
that sympathy was an important quality of evolved humanity but, while hedging bets 
about its origin, he insisted that it was shared with other social animals. Sympathy has 
adaptive use value and thus is a comprehensible manifestation of the natural 
mechanisms that drive evolutionary change, as Darwin explains: 
With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation, probably add, as Mr. 
Bain has shewn, to the power of sympathy; we are led by the hope of 
receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic kindness to others; and 
sympathy is much strengthened by habit. In however complex a manner this 
feeling may have originated, as it is one of high importance to all those 
animals which aid and defend one another, it will have been increased through 
natural selection; for those communities, which included the greatest number 




In The Emotions and the Will (1859), Alexander Bain, the psychologist 
Darwin cites here, argued that humans have a tendency mimetically to assume the 
bodily states, attitudes or movements of others, actions that in turn imply 
accompanying internal states. But Bain is circumspect about the instinctual mimetic 
‘tendency’ he hypothesizes, calling it a ‘disposition’ merely to ‘fall in’ with the 
manifested emotions and actions of those around us, a disposition very often blocked 
by self-oriented energies and demonstrably facilitated by being in unusually 
unfocused and unabsorbed states of mind. His description consolidates a view of 
sympathy as antithetic to self-control and the exertion of will, leaving its ethical 
traction weak.
27
 Elsewhere in the same book Bain underlines instead the intellectual 
component of sympathy, associating it not with automatic mimetic behaviour but 
reflective, cognitive, and ‘civilized’ human endowment. ‘It cannot be too much 
reflected on that sympathy is an intellectual endowment, and flourishes only under a 
certain development of intelligence’, he insists.
28
  
Sympathy thus toggled uncomfortably back and forth between instinctual 
body and ‘advanced’ cognitive consciousness. Such distinctions were at the heart of 
debate about where humans stood in evolutionary terms. Leslie Stephen was one of 
many who tried to resolve matters: on this occasion by making sympathy the natural 
bedrock of reason. ‘”Put yourself in his place” is not merely a moral precept’, he 
insisted in The Science of Ethics (1882): ‘it is a logical rule implied in the earliest 
germs of reason as a description of reasoning itself’.
29
 But his assertion clashed with 
influential arguments that were unsettling the very notion of consciousness as the 
source of motive and action. Psycho-physiological theories posited an instinctual 
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reflex body-brain system reacting automaton-like to its environment.
30
 The journal 
Mind, set up in 1876 in part to consolidate the new disciplinary field of psychology, 
discussed sympathy frequently without resolving these tensions. Indeed, making 
sympathy psychological intensified rather than solved problems of definition and 
understanding. Writing to one of Eliot’s friends in 1873, George Henry Lewes 
admitted: ‘sympathy is one of the great psychological mysteries – and as a 
psychologist I am bound to explain it, but can’t’.
31
 Sympathy remained dogged by the 
possibility – celebrated and feared in equal measure – that it is merely a manifestation 
of the machine-like functioning of group survival. 
By the 1870s the ‘direct promptings of the sympathetic feelings’ that Eliot 
advocated in the 1850s could easily refer to a physio-psychological system 
‘automatically’ at work. Daniel Deronda was written in the decade that saw the most 
intense discussion and dispute about scientific naturalism’s capacity to explain human 
mind and motive. In Eliot’s final novel sympathy is no longer the medium animating 
the ‘faithful pictures of a monotonous homely existence’ celebrated in Adam Bede. 
But nor is it the source of the ‘incalculably diffusive’ effect that is Dorothea Brooke’s 
achievement in Middlemarch, an affective and cognitive sympathy hard-worked for 
and hard won.
32
 From the appearance of the novel’s first published part in February 
1876, attentive readers were struck by something strange and unfamiliar. Henry 
James’ review for the Nation judged ‘the threads of the narrative […] not of the usual 
commercial measurement, but long electric wires capable of transmitting messages 
from mysterious regions’.
33
 Subsequent critics have described the book as ‘pervaded 
by ghosts and “spirits”, by forecasting, foresight and “second sight”’, as ‘steeped in 
references to the fringe sciences’, and as ‘deviating entirely from the codes of 
domestic realism’.
34
 Its gateway epigraph, repeated in each of the eight ‘Books’ that 
appeared between February and September 1876, warns of gothic terror: ‘vengeance, 
footless, irresistible / As exhalations laden with slow death’.
35
 Sympathy is surely 
implicated in what Roger Luckhurst has called the novel’s ‘strange occult 
economies’.
36
 Daniel Deronda does not reject sympathy as the ground of ethical and 
aesthetic value – Eliot had no alternative – but it makes sympathy both ‘automatic’ 
and occult, associated with paralysis and with processes of transmission and 
transmutation. At the same time, the narrative culminates in a future that pushes over 
the edge of novelistic realism: a decayed English society is left voided and the woman 
protagonist who has played its rules is profoundly damaged, her own future uncertain 
and unresolved.  
Occult sympathy in Daniel Deronda 
Daniel Deronda is the novel’s preeminent sympathizer. Like Dorothea in 
Middlemarch his sympathy has the quality of ‘diffusiveness’ but here it is associated 
with paralysis. Walking in Frankfurt’s Judengasse, his curiosity fired by Mirah’s 
history, Daniel is newly interested in the ‘human types’ he sees, an interest stirred by 
the ‘fibre of historic sympathy’ (304). The adjective leaves ambiguous whether the 
history belongs to Daniel or to the Jews, but the sympathy is certainly his and 
provides excuse for a lengthy parenthesis in which the narrator dissects and analyses 
the young man’s current inertia and lack of purpose, ‘traits’ that derive from his 
‘many-sided sympathy’ (304). Sympathy is Daniel’s life problem, barring him from 
vocation: ‘plenteous and flexible’ it hinders his actions. ‘A too reflective and diffusive 
sympathy was in danger of paralyzing in him that indignation against wrong and that 
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selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force’, the narrator asserts 
(305). ‘Reflective analysis’ had been fundamental to sympathizing in Eliot’s novels: it 
is what brings Dorothea Casaubon, in the turbulent early days of her marriage, out of 
moral stupidity to see that her husband, as all humans, ‘had an equivalent centre of 
self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference’ (211). 
But in Daniel’s case it is either excessive (‘too reflective’) or – in one of a long and 
echoing series of sentences about sympathy and reflection – ‘neutralizing’: 
‘[Daniel’s] […] sympathy had ended by falling into one current with that reflective 
analysis which tends to neutralize sympathy’ (305). In either version reflection has 
lost anchor in purposive and imaginative mental activity: more mirror than mind, it 
produces a sympathy that is morally useless. 
Daniel will eventually be braced by his relationship with Mordecai and the 
discovery of his Jewish identity. Following the fateful trip to Genoa to meet his 
mother, he returns home impatient to be reunited with his newfound destiny:  
It was as if he had found an added soul in finding his ancestry – his judgment 
no longer wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy, but choosing, with 
that noble partiality which is man’s best strength, the closer fellowship that 
makes sympathy practical – exchanging that bird’s-eye reasonableness which 
soars to avoid preference and loses all sense of quality, for the generous 
reasonableness of drawing shoulder to shoulder with men of like inheritance. 
(638) 
In the second (and preferred) instance of reasonableness in this passage, the qualifier 
is unexpected – at least from George Eliot’s pen. Surely for most Victorians, most of 
the time, the task of ‘drawing shoulder to shoulder’ with kin – or with extrapolations 
of kin, ‘men of like inheritance’– is the obvious position to adopt, where generosity is 
least in need? Almost every account of sympathy sees it beginning with kin and 
widening from that point. It is precisely this task of widening sympathies that is the 
core value of Eliot’s realism: ‘There is nothing I should care more to do […] than 
rouse the imagination of men and women to a vision of human claims in those races 
of their fellow-men who most differ from them in customs and beliefs’.
37
 Equally as 
perplexing as this apparent retrenchment on the moral work of extending sympathy is 
what the passage suggests about the discovery of Daniel’s soul, or his identity. To 
borrow Andrew H. Miller’s pithy gloss: ‘One might say that Deronda has found 
himself, but only if one also says that such a discovery was of someone else.’
38
  
 Daniel’s sympathetic relationship to Mordecai depends on a very different 
mechanism of affinity, characterized most frequently as transmission, transmutation, 
and transmigration. Mordecai welcomes his own approaching death at the novel’s end 
as ‘the divine kiss which […] gives me full presence in your soul’, saying to Daniel: 
‘Have I not breathed my soul into you?’ (683). Earlier in the narrative, waiting on 
Blackfriar’s Bridge, Mordecai has sight of the ‘prefigured friend’ at whose coming 
‘[o]bstacles, incongruities, all melted’ (416). Daniel arrives at the bridge as if 
conjured by Mordecai’s wish. The occult resonance of this moment is intriguingly 
sanctioned under the imprimatur of scientific method since Daniel’s coming is also 
likened to ‘the first stirrings of change that correspond to what in the fervor of 
prevision [the experimenter’s] thought has foreshadowed’ (416). The reader is pulled 
backwards towards alchemy or, with the vantage of time, forwards a few years to the 
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formation of the Society for Psychical Research, which explicitly dedicated its work 
to the scientific investigation of paranormal and occult phenomena.
39
 In this moment, 
Mordecai attracts the receptive Daniel even as Daniel feels himself resistant, 
‘strangely wrought upon’ (417). Sympathy permeates the relation between the men 
but this sympathy is shorn of all affective, cognitive or intellectual force. It is barely 
recognizable as the sympathy with which Eliot’s ethics and her realist aesthetic is so 
closely associated. It is akin to the pull of the lodestone, and seems more at home in 
earlier classical and renaissance ideas of sympathy as a powerful type of affinity 
drawing like to like. 
 In the rule-breaking plot of Daniel Deronda, the discovery of his soul propels 
Daniel away from a morally and spiritually evacuated England and Europe. 
Gwendolen, the female protagonist set up from the novel’s first page as his likely 
mate, remains. Her story is dominated by antipathy, sympathy’s original twin, and her 
own versions of magical thinking and ‘second sight’ are associated with terror and 
dread. Many readers of Daniel Deronda have tried to make redemptive sense of 
Gwendolen’s plot, stranded as she seems at the novel’s future-looking close in the 
grammatical hesitancy of her last words, written to Daniel: ‘It is better – it shall be 
better with me because I have known you’ (682). This is a phrase Gwendolen has 
already voiced, several times, and as early as her encounter with Daniel in the Abbey 
library: ‘It may be – it shall be better with me’ (383). Between these two instances 
Gwendolen has moved from egoistic expectation that her imperious wishes will 
inevitably be fulfilled to a terrifying fear that her thoughts magically make things 
happen: ‘I knew no way of killing him there, but I did, I did kill him in my thoughts’, 
she famously confesses of her husband’s drowning (586).  
Gwendolen and Mordecai both have second sight.
40
 Mordecai’s is referred to a 
mysticism sanctioned in the novel: it proves successful for both him and Daniel. But 
Gwendolen’s is associated with vulnerability and terror. When Daniel urges that her 
‘vision’ – her belief in the omnipotence of her thought – can be a ‘preparation’, and 
that her life can grow ‘like a plant’ towards moral regeneration, his words are likened 
to the touch of ‘a miraculous hand’, creating the ‘beginning of a new existence’ inside 
Gwendolen. But this power ‘stirring in her vaguely’ is itself the product of the 
‘infused action of another soul’: ‘the new existence’, the narrator tells us, ‘seemed 
inseparable from Deronda: the hope seemed to make his presence permanent’ (648). 
Nevertheless, Gwendolen learns, with yet another staggering shock ‘in which she felt 
herself reduced to a mere speck’ (677), that Daniel will leave. In the end, he can only 
promise that ‘I shall be more with you than I used to be […] our minds may get 
nearer’, as he parts from Gwendolen for the final time (679). Is her trust in his 
thinking about her, and her own ability to think about him, enough to sustain the life 
possibilities of a young, badly damaged woman in a society the novel so savagely 
impugns?
41
 It is a lot to trust in, and to do so one may need, like Gwendolen, to 
believe in magical thinking.  
In Adam Smith’s account of sympathy, self-modification in relation to a 
spectator helps weave together the fibres of a society composed of active agents. But 
women are uncertainly positioned in relation to these mirroring acts of propriety: 
potentially outside the mutually modifying work of sympathy that stabilizes the social 
world, they are expected ‘naturally’ to feel for others and their welfare, and they are 
deemed culpabale if and when this feeling fails. By the mid-Victorian period, in the 
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industrial heartlands of the north, Gaskell shared in a widely felt distress about the 
‘condition of England’. She made women central to the depiction of working-class 
bonds in her fictions, figuring political hope modeled on domestic virtues of love and 
duty. The sympathy that permeates the domestic space, and is practiced so 
assiduously by Margaret Hale in relation to her flawed parents, is sustained by 
Christian principle: the need to be loving and to do loving actions grounds Margaret’s 
sympathetic work. Eliot could no longer depend on such ground and so sought to 
make the detailed attentiveness of her realism an ethical resource. Her realist plots 
model the cognitive and affective processes of sympathizing that must be achieved 
and sustained by both character and narrator.  
By the 1870s, however, the modern philosophical temper that Eliot had helped 
to craft had created the conditions for new versions of sympathy. The ‘natural’ 
swelling of sympathetic feeling (its ‘direct promptings’) could now readily be referred 
to an instinctual body system, working ‘automatically’ in response to environmental 
stimuli. In Middlemarch, Eliot provides her most finely textured portrait of a 
sympathetic woman in Dorothea Brooke. Whatever readers’ response to the small-
scale canvas of her story’s close, the ‘unhistoric acts’ of a ‘hidden life’ (), there is no 
doubting Dorothea’s agency as she confronts her great life crises. One of the worst, 
when she believes herself betrayed by Will Ladislaw after seeing him with Rosamond 
Lydgate, precipitates something like a blueprint of Eliotean sympathy as Dorothea 
forces herself to reflection (‘she forced herself to think of it as bound up with another 
woman’s life’ (787)) and is rewarded with an epiphanic opening to the world, a 
glimpse through her bedroom window of the ‘involuntary, palpitating life’ (788) of 
which she is part. Gwendolen, by contrast, has no agency whatsoever when similarly 
forced to think of another woman’s life: confronted by Lydia Glasher at the 
Whispering Stones she is terrifyingly beset by ‘some ghastly vision’ as ‘in a dream’, 
saying ‘”I am a woman’s life”’ (126).  
There is very little, in the breaking of Gwendolen’s egoism, to suggest that 
sympathy could restore her to agency. By the end of Daniel Deronda, sympathy in its 
recognizably Eliotean form cannot mend the nation; and if it can help Gwendolen to 
become ‘the best of women’, it seems only able to do so through projections and 
infusions, through transmutation and materialized wishes (682). For Daniel the same 
forces, severed from reflective consciousness, propel him into new (if uncertain) 
potential beyond the limits of Europe and the novel. Gwendolen is left to trouble our 
confidence in both sympathy and realism, underlining the fact that women have 
always had a harder task with the former (not quite capable of it in its best versions, 
but condemned for its absence). The pressure of the scientific re-definitions of 
sympathy with which Eliot was so intensely engaged, and the decayed contemporary 
world her novel depicts, both work to push sympathy and realism beyond their limits. 
Although in 1931, Woolf still needed to recall the spectre of ‘womanly sympathy’ 
that had so threatened her own professional identity she was by then attacking a 
caricature that Eliot had already gone way beyond, one that was unsustainable by the 
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